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A Cognitive Science Approach to 
Takings 
By JOHN MARTINEZ* 
No matter how beautiful and no matter how perfectly the laws or the 
way may bring order into the lives of the People, those powers must be 
renewed; otherwise the People will become separated from their laws. 
They will no longer understand the power of their symbols, and it will 
not be long before the power they are following will destroy them. First 
the ritual will become important; then the law and ritual will demand 
that the People follow the law blindly. The People will become blind to 
their own law, and that power will devour them. The way and the law 
must be completely understood by the People and truly be a part of the 
People. 
—Hyemeyohsts Storm, Song of Heyoehkah1 
Introduction 
TAKINGS LAW DETERMINES WHEN governmental action has such 
an impact on private property that a remedy, by way of injunction, 
damages, or forced condemnation, is required by Just Compensation 
clauses in state and federal constitutions.2 Examples include governmental 
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thank Dean Martha L. Minow of Harvard Law School and Professor Richard Delgado of the 
University of Alabama School of Law for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I would 
also like to thank my wife, Karen Martinez, for her patience with me as I worked through the 
complexities of this work. Portions of this manuscript are drawn from my Government Takings 
Treatise and are used here with permission from Thomson-Reuters/West. The Article was 
supported in part by the S.J. Quinney School of Law Excellence in Teaching and Research Fund. 
 1. HYEMEYOHSTS STORM, SONG OF HEYOEHKAH 131 (1981) (quotations omitted). See 
also HYEMEYOHSTS STORM, SEVEN ARROWS 1–11 (1972). 
 2. Error! Main Document Only.The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides 
in relevant part: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
State just compensation provisions are similar to the federal just compensation clause, except that 
many add that “damaging” of private property will also give rise to a takings claim. See, e.g., CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 19(a) (“Private property may be taken or damaged for a public use and only 
when just compensation . . . has first been paid . . . .”); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 22 (“Private 
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.”). 
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prohibitions against the filling of wetlands,3 prohibitions on the sale of eagle 
feathers,4 and restrictions on modifying historic structures.5 
Takings doctrine,6 however, is in serious disarray. Courts and 
commentators have long been baffled by identification of the relevant 
property for purposes of takings analysis and determining exactly when a 
“taking” occurs.7 
This Article addresses the takings problem by proposing that we 
change the discourse. The Article suggests that a cognitive science 
approach to the takings field will result in a reconstruction of this area that 
will allow us to better address the concerns underlying the present doctrinal 
confusion. Part I describes the field of cognitive science, which seeks to 
organize knowledge in terms of what we perceive and the way we use 
cognitive models to learn and re-learn the world around us.8 The Article 
demonstrates that legal doctrines can be productively viewed as cognitive 
models. The Article then critically analyzes the strengths and shortcomings 
of viewing legal doctrines in cognitive terms.9 
Part II illustrates the application of the cognitive science approach to 
the takings area.10 Since the area has proved particularly intractable under 
conventional legal analysis,11 it is an especially useful laboratory in which to 
 
 3. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611–12 (2001); Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. 
United States, 707 F.3d 1286, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 4. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 52–54 (1979). 
 5. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978). 
 6. For a more thorough examination of the takings doctrine, see infra Part II. 
 7. See Error! Main Document Only.Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (“[T]his 
Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice 
and fairness’ require . . . [compensation] by the government . . . .”); see also San Diego Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 636, 649 n.15 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“One 
distinguished commentator has characterized the attempt to differentiate ‘regulation’ from 
‘taking’ as ‘the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of contemporary land-use 
law . . . one that may be the lawyer’s equivalent of the physicist’s hunt for the quark.’” (quoting 
CHARLES HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1976)); Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not 
the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings 
Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307, 308 (1998) (“The incoherence of the U.S. Supreme Court’s output in 
this field has by now been demonstrated time and again by practitioners and academic 
commentators ad nauseam, and I refuse to add to the ongoing gratuitous slaughter of trees for the 
paper consumed in this frustrating and increasingly pointless enterprise.”); Lynda J. Oswald, 
Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 
WASH. L. REV. 91, 91 (1995); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a 
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 566–67 (1984) (criticizing the diminution in value test). 
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. See infra Part I. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (2003) 
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test a cognitive science approach. Cognitive analysis reveals that 
conventional takings doctrine is a captive of the public-private distinction, 
which posits a domain of private existence completely separate from 
government.12 Because property rights gain significance only when 
enforced by government, and since conventional takings doctrine 
presupposes instead sharply differentiated public and private domains, the 
use of conventional takings analysis to differentiate a clear boundary 
between public and private spheres in property law is bound to fail.13 
Cognitive analysis points the way toward alternative formulations of takings 
analysis that do not suffer from that critical weakness. 
I. Cognitive Science 
A. What is Cognitive Science?14 
Cognitive science15 is the study16 of how we acquire, process, and use 
 
(“Regulatory takings doctrine . . . is famously incoherent.”); Rose, supra note 7, at 561 (“By far the 
most intractable constitutional property issue is whether certain governmental actions ‘take’ 
property without satisfying the constitutional requirements of due process and just 
compensation.”). 
 12. See generally Hila Shamir, The Public/Private Distinction Now: The Challenges of Privatization 
and of the Regulatory State, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 2–3 (2014) (“[F]ocus[ing] on the 
survival and perhaps revival of the distinction in the regulatory state of the twenty-first century, 
and sketch[ing] what form it may take today.”); Christian Turner, Law’s Public/Private Structure, 39 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1003, 1004–08 (2012) (suggesting that the categorization of laws as public or 
private should depend on the relative institutional capacities of public or private actors). 
 13. One way to address the problems that the embedded public-private distinction causes 
for takings doctrine is to reconstruct takings doctrine by conceiving of property rights in the same 
fashion as we think of sovereignty rights. See John Martinez, Reconstructing the Takings Doctrine by 
Redefining Property and Sovereignty, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157, 176–78, 187–94 (1988). In the 
present article, I suggest an alternative approach that transcends legal doctrine and posits a 
radically different way of looking at law in general and at takings doctrine in particular. 
 14. I am indebted to Steven L. Winter and Pierre J. Schlag for their pioneering work in the 
development of a cognitive approach to law. See Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to 
Law, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1989); Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 639 (1990); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and 
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, 
Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989) [hereinafter 
Winter, Transcendental Nonsense]; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988). 
 15. See John Martinez, A Cognitive Science Approach to Teaching Property Rights in Body Parts, 42 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 290, 290–91 (1992). 
 16. It is not a single unified field, but instead exists as a composite of portions of 
“philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, and neuroscience.” 
HOWARD GARDNER, THE MIND’S NEW SCIENCE 6–7, 38–45 (1985). 
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information.17 The insight of cognitive science provides that meaning is in 
large part a function of things we already know.18 These things are method 
constructs for information processing and memory constructs for 
information retention. Such constructs are embodied in a “cognitive” 
dimension of human activity with respect to information.19 They may be 
expressed in visual terms, such as pictures, diagrams, or graphs,20 or in 
 
 17. See id. at 6. There is a substantial body of scholarship on cognitive science. See, e.g., 
PHILLIP J. DAVIS & REUBEN HERSH, THE MATHEMATICAL EXPERIENCE (1981); HOWARD 
GARDNER, THE MIND’S NEW SCIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION (2d ed. 
1987); PHILIP JOHNSON-LAIRD, THE COMPUTER AND THE MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE (1989); ZENON W. PYLYSHYN, COMPUTATION AND COGNITION: 
TOWARD A FOUNDATION FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE (1984); STEPHEN STICH, FROM FOLK 
PSYCHOLOGY TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE: THE CASE AGAINST BELIEF (1983). See also John 
Martinez, From Lark Rise to The Storied City, 3 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 141, 141 (2014) 
(suggesting a storytelling approach to analyze local government law). 
 18. JEAN M. MANDLER, STORIES, SCRIPTS, AND SCENES: ASPECTS OF SCHEMA THEORY 
113 (1984) (“There is indeed structure in the environment, but except at fairly simple perceptual 
levels, it must be learned through experience. When it is learned it becomes a mental structure 
that guides the course of future information extraction. The knowledge that is so gained does not 
consist of lists of unrelated factors or a heap of haphazard associations. As Piaget so often 
emphasized, the mind has a tendency to organize itself.”). 
 19. GARDNER, supra note 16, at 38. 
 20. Chaos theory is a related field of learning that touches on the central themes of 
cognitive science. Sometimes known as nonequilibrium theory or transformation theory, chaos 
theory “presents a view of the processes of change in which instability, disorder, and 
unpredictability serve as central features in the development of new forms of organization and 
complexity.” L. Douglas Kiel, Nonequilibrium Theory and Its Implications for Public Administration, 49 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 544, 544 (1989). Chaos theory attempts to explain how apparently random 
systems, such as natural phenomena, may suddenly and unpredictably experience dramatic 
transformations. See, e.g., ROBERT SHAW, THE DRIPPING FAUCET AS A MODEL CHAOTIC 
SYSTEM 1–3 (1984) (providing the example of dripping faucets); THOMAS A. BASS, THE 
EUDAEMONIC PIE 1–11 (1985) (providing the example of roulette wheels); JAMES GLEICK, 
CHAOS, MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 11–14 (1987) (providing the example of weather patterns); 
JOHN BRIGGS & F. DAVID PEAT, TURBULENT MIRROR, AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO CHAOS 
THEORY AND THE SCIENCE OF WHOLENESS 45–52 (1989) (providing an additional example of 
weather patterns). Additionally, chaos theory attempts to explain how social phenomena 
experience dramatic transformations. David Loye & Riane Eisler, Chaos and Transformation: 
Implications of Nonequilibrium Theory for Social Science and Society, 32 BEHAV. SCI. 53, 53–54 (1987). See, 
e.g., Kiel, supra, at 544 (providing the example of methods of public administration); John L. R. 
Proops, Organization and Dissipation in Economic Systems, 6 J. SOCIAL & BIOLOGICAL STRUCTURES 
353, 353 (1983) (providing the example of market economies). At a general level of analysis, the 
application of cognitive theory to understanding of law and legal reasoning may be viewed in 
chaos theory terms as a “paradigm shift” or “transformation” from one way of looking at law to 
another. 
Chaos theory also incorporates the use of graphic representations in the form of diagrams to 
illustrate the operation of dynamic systems. The application of cognitive science to law similarly 
entails the use of mental representations to explain the acquisition, processing, and use of 
information to achieve meaning. This is a characteristic of chaos theory as well in its use of 
graphic representations for understanding the operation and transformation of dynamic systems. 
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conceptual terms such as analytical models, paradigms, schemas, stock 
stories, narratives, or rules.21 For example, the idea of “an apple” may be 
represented in visual terms by the picture of an apple that we saw in our 
first-grade reading books. In conceptual terms, it may be represented as an 
example of a food group we call “fruits” or as an example of the items 
which we can usually safely consume.22 
We live and re-live our experiences through our cognitive models.23 
Thus, we recognize apples because of our cognitive construct of “apple-
ness,” and can adjust our behavior accordingly. If we hold a ripe apple in 
our hand, applying what we already know about apples, we can go ahead 
and eat it without further concern. Knowledge is therefore a process of “re-
cognition” or “knowing again,” as well as the acquisition of fresh 
awareness.24 
 
At that more specific level of analysis as well, then, a cognitive science approach to law resembles 
the explanatory method of chaos theory. 
 21. Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 
1838–39 (1988) (“[O]ur sense of reality is determined . . . by the cognitive constructs that make 
thinking possible.”) (emphasis added); GARDNER, supra note 16, at 383 (“Any number of 
vocabularies and conceptual frameworks have been constructed in an effort to characterize the 
representational level—scripts, schemas, symbols, frames, images, mental models, to name just a 
few.”). See also MANDLER, supra note 18 (discussing the relationship of “schema theory,” another 
branch of the cognitive science tree). 
 22. Cognitive constructs also may be used as metaphors to express a collection of 
characteristics. For example, an apple may be a cognitive construct symbolizing good health, as in 
the expression, “an apple a day keeps the doctor away.” The expression, “an apple for the 
teacher,” may be an ambiguous construct symbolizing either healthy appreciation for a teacher, 
or, in contrast, obsequious behavior to curry favor. 
 23. MANDLER, supra note 18, at 112. 
Selection and abstraction, interpretation and integration surely occur. We would be in a 
sorry state without them. But to understand these processes in detail requires us to 
understand the knowledge structures of the processor, since it is these structures that 
determine what is selected and abstracted, that control interpretation, and into which 
new material is integrated. 
Id. 
 24. GARDNER, supra note 16, at 126. 
[R]esearchers have come to appreciate anew that human subjects do not come to tasks 
as empty slates: they have expectations and well-structured schemata within which they 
approach diverse materials . . . . Thus, an influential alternative approach in cognitive 
psychology focuses . . . on how the organism, with its structures already prepared for 
stimulation, itself manipulates and otherwise reorders the information it freshly 
encounters—perhaps distorting the information as it is being assimilated, perhaps 
recoding it into more familiar or convenient form once it has been initially 
apprehended. 
Id. 
Gerald Frug makes similar observations in his article on cities: 
In this limited endeavor, I suggest that people perceive the world by selecting out those 
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Cognitive models have descriptive and normative dimensions. The 
descriptive dimension may be defined as an approximation of reality as it is. 
The normative dimension may be defined as an approximation of reality as 
it should be. Each of these dimensions may be expressed in terms of past, 
present, and future time frames. Thus, in their descriptive dimension, 
cognitive models embody recollections of what past reality was; impressions 
of what present reality is; and predictions about what future reality will be. 
For example, we construct an impression of what we were like as children, 
what we are like today, and what we will be like in our old age. In their 
normative dimension, cognitive models embody a desire about what each 
of these time frames should be. Thus, we construct for ourselves a desire of 
what we should have been like as children; a desire about what we should 
be like today, and a desire about what we should be like in our old age. 
The descriptive and normative dimensions of cognitive models play off 
each other. For example, there is constant interplay between what we were 
like, and what we wish we had been like when we were young. Our 
memories begin to fade as our standards for ourselves change, so we may 
tend to believe that we were, in fact, the ideal child that we imagine that 
 
things which seem important to them and that their actions are tailored to those 
selected perceptions. Thus, the empirical world—the economic, demographic, and 
political activities that affect city life—has been the source of people’s understanding of 
cities, and has affected their ideas of and actions regarding city power. But their frames 
of reference, their liberal ideology, have organized the mass of empirical data and 
experience in a way that has channeled their perceptions and actions, and therefore has 
influenced the development of the cities. To put it another way, there has been a 
continual process of accommodation of people’s ideas about cities to the empirical 
world as they saw it and at the same time what was seen has been affected by selecting 
out, or assimilating, possible perceptions of the world and of the city to conform to 
preexisting ideas. The combined process of accommodation of ideas to experience and 
assimilation of experience to ideas means that, to some extent, the world is made to 
conform to our ideas and, to some extent, our ideas are made to conform to the world. 
Such a process should not be totally unfamiliar to lawyers, who understand the world as 
presenting problems that demand legal solutions (a role for experience) and the 
enactment of laws as changing that world by affecting human behavior (a role for ideas). 
The methodology applied here merely broadens that view. It is not only the passage of 
laws that affects how cities develop. Our ideology, that is, our way of understanding the 
world, affects our selection of the laws we pass, and that understanding itself, in addition 
to the laws it generates, affects people’s actions and thus the development of social life. 
Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1079–80 (1980) (footnotes 
omitted). Frug acknowledges that this dynamic may derive from any of the various areas of 
learning, including Gestalt psychology, phenomenology, Marxism, structuralism, or the later 
Wittgenstein. Id. at 1079 n.92. Gardner makes a similar observation by gathering up the fields of 
philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, and neuroscience under 
the umbrella of cognitive science. GARDNER, supra note 16, at 6–7 (describing that “cognitive 
science” exists as a composite of portions of each of these fields, not as a single, unified cognitive 
science). 
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every child should be. To extend the example into the present time frame; 
as our standards for ourselves change, we may tend to believe that we are, 
in fact, the people we believe we should be. Reaching into the future, in this 
same way, we may tend to believe that we will, in fact, become the people 
we think we should be. 
The interplay between the descriptive and normative dimensions of 
our cognitive models has profound implications. If what we see is a function 
of what we want to believe is real, then we will only see what we want to 
see. Our cognitive models, thus, are not just tools we use to observe the 
world; they also embody and implement our values by determining what 
we see and how we value (or devalue) what we see. If this interaction 
between the descriptive and normative dimensions of cognitive models 
exists in reference to the physical world, it is reasonable to believe that it 
also exists in reference to the world of ideas, such as the realm of law. 
Cognitive models are not new in the law. We use powerful cognitive 
representations about reality and about the processes of reasoning in law—
and we may do so implicitly and without reflection. For example, we use 
“A v. B” to represent the “reality” of an appellate resolution of a legal 
dispute. This is the symbolic expression of a dichotomy, one of the most 
powerfully captivating forms of reasoning.25 It embodies the idea that either 
A or B will win. The possibility that both will win, or that both will lose, 
does not fit comfortably within that cognitive construct. We also reify the 
symbolic representation of the dispute by treating the cognitive construct as 
if it were reality: we make arguments for each side. As the substantial 
literature on alternative dispute resolution demonstrates, reality is far from 
that paradigm of sharply focused contests turning on a few issues.26 
Another example of cognitive modeling in law is the classic 





 25. JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION viii (Barbara Johnson trans., 1981) (discussing 
such dichotomies as bipolar conceptualizations). 
 26. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ERIC D. GREEN & FRANK E.A. SANDER, DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION (1985); Jeffrey S. Brenner, Alternatives to Litigation: Toxic Torts and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution—A Proposed Solution to the Mass Tort Case, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 779 (1989); James J. Calder, 
James P. Kleinberg, Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & Carlton A. Varner, A New Alternative to Antitrust 
Litigation: Arbitration of Antitrust Disputes, 3 ANTITRUST 18 (1989); Steven C. Nelson, Alternatives to 
Litigation of International Disputes, 23 INT’L LAW. 187 (1989); Steering Committee Report, American 
Law Institute Study on Paths to a “Better Way”: Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
811 (1989).  
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This model communicates a deductive process that moves from 
identification of the facts, to identification of the questions raised by those 
facts, to the identification of the applicable rules for resolving those facts, to 
a discussion of the interrelationship of facts, rules, and issues, and then 
moving inexorably to the conclusion in the case. However, as we become 
more familiar with the workings of judicial decision making, this formal 
approach quickly breaks down. We find that the rules reflect deeper social 
values, that the rules change as values change, and that values change as 
society changes. We learn that facts become relevant or irrelevant 
according to the applicable doctrine. We learn that the identity of the issues 
is affected by whether the doctrine is in flux or relatively stable. We find 
that analysis can take many different forms, and, finally, we discover that 
conclusions are ephemeral, controlling only with respect to the space and 
time that gave rise to the particular dispute. 
Cognitive science seeks to place talk of the cognitive dimension of 
human activity on an equal footing with conventional modes of discourse.27 
There is a well-established tradition of incorporating ideas from the natural 
sciences28 and social sciences29 into legal analysis,30 so it is not surprising 
that a significant body of scholarship has already developed around the 
application of cognitive science to law.31 This Article adds to the 
 
 27. GARDNER, supra note 16, at 383; Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 14, at 1106. 
 28. See, e.g., G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social 
Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1013–26 (1972); Donald H. 
Gjerdingen, The Politics of the Coase Theorem and Its Relationship to Modern Legal Thought, 35 BUFF. L. 
REV. 871, 907 (1986). 
 29. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON CAIRNS, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1969); MORRIS L. 
COHEN, NAOMI RONEN & JAN STEPAN, LAW & SCIENCE: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1978); 
RICHARD LEMPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: 
DESERT, DISPUTES AND DISTRIBUTION (1986); LEON LIPSON & STANTON WHEELER, LAW 
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1988); WALLACE D. LOH, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS: CASES, READINGS AND TEXT (1984); JULIUS STONE, LAW AND THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES IN THE SECOND HALF CENTURY (1966); JUNE L. TAPP & FELICE J. LEVINE, LAW, 
JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES (1977). 
 30. See generally COHEN, RONEN & STEPAN, supra note 29 (listing works involving analysis on 
law and science). 
 31. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1989); 
Gerald P. López, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984); Schlag, supra note 14; see also Timothy 
P. Terrell, Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of Legal Reasoning and the Development of Fundamental 
Normative Principles, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 288, 304–07 (1984) (applying cognitive principles to explain 
legal reasoning by means of graphic representations, such as lines, planes, and cubes). For an 
excellent discussion on how entrenched cognitive models act as cognitive blocking mechanisms on 
counter-hegemonic methods of legal analysis, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL 
MARTINEZ_FINAL EDITS_GUNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/25/2015 1:10 PM 
Issue 3] A COGNITIVE SCIENCE APPROACH TO TAKINGS 473 
 
conversation. 
B. A Cognitive Science Approach to Law 
Cognitive science explains that the processes of formation, use, and 
transformation of cognitive models are systematic and imaginative. The 
first step involves the “basic experiences” common to all human beings by 
virtue of the general structure and functioning of the human organism in its 
environment.32 For example, one of these basic experiences is our primal 
discovery “that we can obtain desired objects by moving toward them 
through space.”33 As a second step, we conceptualize—or imagine—
cognitive models that embody these basic experiences. Thus, we may 
imagine a source-path-goal cognitive model to represent the basic experience 
of obtaining a desired object by moving toward it through space.34 Third, 
we may use the source-path-goal cognitive model and its source, basic 
experience to “experience” more abstract purposive behaviors, such as our 
conceiving of a half-completed task as “being halfway there.”35 Finally, we 
may use the source-path-goal cognitive model as the basis for metaphors to 
structure other aspects of our existence. Thus, the metaphor, “Life is a 
journey,” may be elaborated from the source-path-goal cognitive model to 
conceptualize the nature of life.36 
We use cognitive models and their derivative metaphors to 
understand, retain, and apply more complex concepts.37 Legal concepts 
thus can be profitably explored in terms of a cognitive science approach.38 
For example, conceived in terms of cognitive models, legal doctrine may be 
said to arrange legal analysis into core areas of certainty—in which “most 
legally trained observers committed to applying [a] rule will experience the 
 
LEGAL STUDIES 270–356 (1987) (discussing a move toward cognitive theory of legitimation). 
 32. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 14, at 1133. 
 33. Id. at 1132. 
 34. Id. Winter sets out some of the most important schemas as source-path-goal, container 
(in-or-out orientation), front-back, center-periphery, part-whole, and balancing. Id. at 1147. These 
will be discussed later in the Article as the experientialist epistemological approach as applied to 
legal doctrine. See infra Part I.D. 
 35. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 14, at 1132. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1133–34. 
 38. “Experientialist epistemology suggests that the courts will not function in a substantially 
different manner [if they self-consciously acknowledge the figurative discourse that clothes their 
decisionmaking]: They will not be able to purge metaphors from their analyses, but will be driven 
to other metaphors.” Id. at 1164. “Metaphor is inevitable in legal analysis because it is central to 
human rationality; it is a primary mode of comprehension and reasoning.” Id. at 1166. 
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rule as having sufficient structure to constrain decision”—and peripheries, 
where the degree of “fit” between the cognitive model and the particular 
circumstances leads to indeterminacy, and where metaphoric extensions of 
the cognitive model inform the manner in which we resolve cases.39  
Expressing substantive legal doctrines as categorical imperatives 
reveals their core-and-periphery structure. Thus, for example, “if there are 
facts evidencing an offer, an acceptance and consideration, then the legal 
conclusion that there is a contract can be drawn.”40 Or, “if there are facts 
evidencing a governmental approval of a construction project, upon which 
a developer has substantially and reasonably relied in good faith, then the 
legal conclusion can be drawn that the developer has a vested right to 
continue the project to its completion even though the prevailing zoning 
regime has been changed to prohibit the project.”41 There are 
circumstances that fall clearly within the cores of these doctrines. For 
example, if a person does not assent to be bound, then in the absence of 
any other factors suggesting that we find an enforceable relationship, no 
contract will be found.42 Similarly, if no governmental representation is 
made, there is no basis upon which the developer can claim to have 
 
 39. Id. at 1182–83 (emphasis added). See also Willard Van Orman Quine, Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism, in WILLIAM R. BISHIN & CHRISTINA D. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS 327 
(1972) (referring to rules as force fields with cores and peripheries); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and 
Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 533–38 (1986) (also 
referring to “force fields” of legal doctrines). The “core” of legal doctrines might also be viewed as 
the idea of the “determinate” character of law: “The main criterion for judging the existence of a 
determinate answer is whether virtually any intelligent person familiar with the legal system would 
conclude, after careful study, that the law provides that answer.” Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can 
Be Determinate, 38 UCLA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990). The rhetorical technique of conceptualizing legal 
analysis dealing with “force fields” with cores and peripheries, of course, is itself a cognitive 
model. It allows us to ask whether there are any rules for determining which particular legal rule-
cognitive model—is applicable in any given situation. This “characterization” step can have a 
powerful effect on the outcome in any particular case. Our central project here, however, is not to 
deal with the substance of outcomes, but to demonstrate that the cognitive approach can help 
illuminate the way in which we do legal analysis. 
 40. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1990); Ferguson v. New 
England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 554 N.E.2d 1013, 1015 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Shell Pipeline Corp. v. 
Coastal States Trading, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 837, 844 (Tex. App. 1990). 
 41. See Richard B. Cunningham & David H. Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land 
Development Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 623, 625–26 (1978); Donald G. Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting 
in the Age of Multi-Land Use Permits, 11 SW. U. L. REV. 545, 549–50 (1979); David G. Heeter, Zoning 
Estoppel: Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 URB. 
L. ANN. 63, 63–64 (1971). 
 42. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1982) (“[In general,] the 
formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to 
the exchange . . . .”). 
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reasonably relied, so no vested right will be found.43 Exploring these legal 
doctrines at their peripheries, suppose a promisee reasonably understands a 
promise as intended to induce action, and reasonably relies upon it to his or 
her detriment or to the benefit of the promisor. Then one can say that 
another cognitive model, promissory estoppel, has been brought into play.44 
Similarly, suppose a person completes a construction project and a good 
reason of social policy in such a scenario (such as the need to avoid waste), 
screams out for consideration. Then the nonconforming use theory, whereby 
governments must allow a reasonable time for such persons to realize their 
investment in such projects, comes into play.45 
C. The Special Role of Standards of Judicial Review 
Judicial review of governmental action is a court’s appraisal of the 
correctness of government conduct.46 Government conduct may take the 
form of legislative, judicial, or administrative action. Standards of judicial 
review are the cognitive lenses through which courts perceive governmental 
conduct. The elements of such cognitive constructs define not only the 
“reality” which courts perceive, but also the standard against which the 
validity of that reality will be measured.47 
Standards of judicial review of governmental action play a crucial role 
in legal doctrine. Traditional “legal process” forms of judicial review, for 
instance,48 examine the validity of governmental action in reference to 
 
 43. See generally 3 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 16:64 (2014) (discussing 
the element of a governmental representation as essential to a claim of estoppel or vested right). 
 44. Quake Constr., Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 537 N.E.2d 863, 867–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1989); Panto v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 547 A.2d 260, 266 (N.H. 1988); Contempo Constr. Co. 
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 736 P.2d 13, 16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
 45. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 610 P.2d 407, 410–12, 425–28 (Cal. 
1979), rev’d on other grounds, 453 U.S. 490, 493–97 (1981) (billboards); Harris v. Mayor & City 
Council of Baltimore, 371 A.2d 706, 706–12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (holding that structures 
converted to multi-unit dwellings were required to be rolled-back to prior, less intensive use). See 
generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 194–98 (1981). 
 46. John Martinez, A Critical Analysis of the 1987 Takings Trilogy: The Keystone, Nollan and First 
English Cases, 1 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 39, 56–65 (1988). 
 47. Stephen M. Feldman, Exposing Sunstein’s Naked Preferences, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1341–44 
(1989) (discussing how standards of judicial review are pre-conceived notions of what we expect to 
see); Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 13–17 (1987) (examining how the 
Supreme Court’s often unstated vantage points affect outcomes); Schlag, supra note 14, at 1209–
20 (1989) (discussing prerationalist, rationalist, modernist, and postmodernist cognitive modes of 
perception used as forms of standards of judicial review). 
 48. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958). 
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broad policy objectives, depending at least initially on the nature of the 
interests affected by such action.49 For example, governmental action that 
only affects economic interests is generally viewed with great deference by 
courts.50 Courts first ascertain whether merely economic interests are 
affected by the governmental action, and if so, go on to ask whether there is 
a legitimate governmental objective sought to be achieved, and whether the 
means used to achieve it are reasonably likely to do so under the 
circumstances.51 More activist standards of judicial review52 apply when 
fundamental rights, such as speech or privacy,53 or suspect trait 
 
 49. This of course is a result of footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products, in which the 
Court distinguished between judicial protection of economic interests and liberty interests. 304 
U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938). See Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner’s Shadow: Toward a Coherent 
Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 361 (1995); see also Michael A. Fitts, The Vices 
of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 
1567, 1571 (1988). 
 50. The classic case making this distinction is Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 
490 (1955). See also Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (utilizing minimal 
scrutiny in the zoning setting). 
 51. In Hancock Industries v. Schaeffer, the court said: 
The court accepts at face value contemporaneous declarations of the legislative 
purposes, or, in the absence thereof, rationales constructed after the fact, unless “an 
examination of the circumstances forces [the court] to conclude that they ‘could not 
have been a goal of the legislation.’” Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 
456, 463 n.7 (1981) (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975)). 
Thus, where “there are plausible reasons for [the legislative] action, [the court’s] inquiry 
is at an end. It is, of course, ‘constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact 
underlay the legislative decision.’” U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 
166, 179 (1980) (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)). 
This court recently examined whether, in seeking a legislative purpose supporting a 
provision under equal protection challenge where the legislative history does not 
disclose any purpose, the court is limited to considering only actual, articulated 
purposes. Delaware River Basin Comm’n v. Bucks County. Water & Sewer Auth., 641 
F.2d 1087, 1094–97 (3d Cir. 1981). We concluded: “So long as we are careful not to 
attribute to the legislature purposes which it cannot reasonably be understood to have 
entertained, we find that in examining the challenged provisions we may consider 
purposes advanced by counsel for the Commission or suggested initially by ourselves.” 
Id. at 1097 (internal citations and footnote omitted). 
Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 237 n.10, 238 (3d Cir. 1987). See generally LAURENCE 
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-2–16-5 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing minimum 
rationality review under the Equal Protection Clause). But see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that 
close scrutiny is required when property is affected by governmental action). 
 52. “Strict scrutiny is thus the process whereby a court makes a detailed examination of a 
statute, rule or order of a tribunal for exact compliance with, or adherence to, a standard or 
norm. It is the antithesis of a deferential review.” Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629, 632 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
 53. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460–63 (1958) (freedom of association); 
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classifications, such as race, are involved.54 In those settings, courts inquire 
whether the government can show an “important” or “compelling” 
governmental objective to be achieved, whether the means involved is likely 
to “substantially advance” or is “necessary” to the achievement of the 
objective, whether there are “alternative channels” for the exercise of the 
fundamental right involved, and perhaps whether the government has 
selected the least restrictive means to achieve that objective.55 In 
comparison to these traditional approaches to standards of judicial review 
of governmental action, revisionist economic theories seek to have courts 
ensure that legislatures are acting “efficiently.”56 “Civic virtue” forms of 
judicial review, in contrast, seek to have courts assure that legislatures are 
sufficiently “public-regarding.”57 
Regardless of which theoretical foundation is used, standards of 
judicial review embody significant substantive values that are implemented 
each time the standards are applied. As such, they are particularly powerful 
kinds of cognitive models. Therefore, we cannot fully understand legal 
doctrine in cognitive terms without taking the role of standards of judicial 
review into account because, in a very real sense, substantive law is 
manifested through such standards. 
 
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (right to vote); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 152–54 (1973) (right to privacy). For a recent discussion of fundamental interests 
generally, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439–47 (1985). But see 
C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 
741–42 (1986) (criticizing the dichotomy between liberty and property interests and suggesting 
that we need to refine our understanding of both instead). 
 54. See generally TRIBE, supra note 51, § 16-14 (discussing racial discrimination and equal 
protection issues). 
 55. Id. § 12-30 (discussing the concept of less restrictive alternatives in the context of First 
Amendment protections from laws that are overbroad or vague). 
 56. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 
(1984); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544–47 (1983); Owen M. 
Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (1979); William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 885–88 (1975); 
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 
800, 815–17 (1983); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial 
Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1346 (1987). 
 57. See Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of 
the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1574–78 (1988) (providing a skeptical perspective 
on the civic virtue approach). For a preliminary analysis of the interactive relationship between 
moral virtue and law, see Donald F. Brosnan, Virtue Ethics in a Perfectionist Theory of Law and Justice, 
11 CARDOZO L. REV. 335, 336–37 (1989). 
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D. The Strengths and Shortcomings of a Cognitive Approach 
to Law 
A significant advantage of cognitive legal epistemology is that it 
expands the methodology of legal analysis to include the role of diverse 
human experiences. This is particularly evident in critical race theory, in 
which scholars of color and feminist scholars argue that if the perception of 
law and legal analysis is in significant part a product of one’s experiences, 
and given that experiences of people of color and women differ significantly 
from males who are not people of color, then the methods of analysis 
brought to bear on law by people of color and women will differ 
commensurately from the methods used by males who are not people of 
color.58 Such an experientialist epistemology provides a useful theoretical 
structure for the elaboration of diverse perspectives of law. In applying that 
structure, this Article makes both descriptive and normative claims: an 
experientialist epistemology may help us understand how conventional 
legal analysis proceeds and perhaps can also guide us toward how it should 
proceed.59 
Conceiving of legal analysis in cognitive terms helps us not only to 
 
 58. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 880 
(1990) (“Experience interacts with an individual’s current perceptions to reveal new 
understandings and to help that individual, with others, make sense of those perceptions.”); 
Richard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95, 95 (1990) 
(discussing the importance of voice in scholarship from the perspective of females and people of 
color); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 2411, 2414–18 (1989) (suggesting the use of narrative as a device to transcend the 
constraints of conventional legal discourse); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a 
Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 561–63 (1984) (arguing that there has been 
systematic exclusion of scholarship by people of color regarding civil rights); Mari Matsuda, 
Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 
1–2 (1988) (discussing exclusion of the views of people of color from traditional legal scholarship); 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the 
Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29, 29–31 (1987) (discussing exclusion of feminist views from 
traditional legal scholarship); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
2073, 2074 (1989) (discussing the use of storytelling as a mental representation for legal analysis); 
Pedagogy of Narrative: A Symposium, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1990). 
 59. SUSANNE K. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY: A STUDY IN THE SYMBOLISM OF 
REASON, RITE, AND ART x–xi (3d ed. 1957). 
The process of philosophical thought moves typically from a first, inadequate, but 
ardent apprehension of some novel idea, figuratively expressed, to more and more 
precise comprehension, until language catches up to logical insight, the figure is 
dispensed with, and literal expression takes its place. Really new concepts, having no 
names in current language, always make their earliest appearance in metaphorical 
statements; therefore the beginning of any theoretical structure is inevitably marked by 
fantastic inventions. 
Id. 
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recognize the cognitive structure of law, but also to more clearly appreciate 
that such cognitive structuring is both liberating and constraining. 
Cognitive models help us cope with reality by allowing us to use embodied 
experiences to structure our perceptions and responses to life. At the same 
time, however, they constrain our ability to “see” things that may be 
important.60 They do so in at least three significant ways. First, as embodied 
experiences, they are static representations of a reality that changes: what 
may have existed in the past may not exist when we use the models to 
inform us about the present or the future. Second, they filter out data which 
may be important; thus, our use of cognitive models may lead us astray, 
either because they were faulty to begin with or because they have become 
outdated. Third, we may begin to engage in idolatry by treating the models 
as if they were reality.  
We do so in at least two ways. First, we begin to address the models 
instead of reality. For example, instead of asking whether it is unfair for 
someone to be subjected to a new zoning regime, even though the person 
started construction before the law was changed, we instead ask whether 
the person has a proper permit and has substantially relied on the permit in 
good faith. While such a construct is useful in the ordinary situation in 
which a sophisticated developer is involved, it may be inappropriate in 
other settings. For example, suppose an elderly person began conversion of 
a single-family residence to a duplex when duplexes were allowed in the 
neighborhood. Suppose further that she is on a fixed social security income 
and needs the revenue from the extra unit to make ends meet. Finally, 
suppose that she merely received oral assurance, not a formal written 
permit from the building department. The vested rights doctrine61—and, in 
fact, most estoppel regimes62—would not allow her to finish the conversion 
if, in the meantime, duplexes have been zoned out of the neighborhood. 
Thus, consideration of the underlying reasons for the vested rights doctrine, 
such as the impact on the property owner in comparison to the interests of 
 
 60. “It is the theory which decides what we can observe.” DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF 
POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL FORECASTING 9 (1973) (quoting Albert 
Einstein, in WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND BEYOND: ENCOUNTERS AND 
CONVERSATIONS 63 (1971)). “What interests us, given who we are and where we stand, affects 
our ability to perceive. . . . [W]e can alter the theory we use to frame our perceptions of the world, 
[but] we cannot see the world unclouded by preconceptions.” Minow, supra note 47, at 46. 
Martha Minow points out that our cognitive models not only determine what we see, but, like 
looking through binoculars prevent us from studying the binoculars, cognitive models also prevent 
us from studying the models themselves. Id. at 72 (“[P]atterns for organizing the world . . . 
foreclose their own reconsideration.”). 
 61. Error! Main Document Only.See 3 MARTINEZ, supra note 43, § 16:64. 
 62. See id. 
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the neighborhood, are not—and, in fact, cannot—be considered. 
Cognitive modeling captures the imagination in a second, perhaps 
more seductive, way.63 We elaborate cognitive models through metaphors. 
Metaphors are figures of speech in which two objects or relationships are 
compared using at least one similarity that they share.64 For example, when 
we say that someone is a tiger, we are stating that he shares at least one 
similarity with a tiger, perhaps aggressiveness. Using a metaphor enables us 
to transmit a substantial amount of information with a single, powerful 
rhetorical device. Knowing that someone is a tiger also conveys to our 
listener that he or she would not want to tangle with this person, since tigers 
have claws and fangs. Unfortunately, metaphoric representations are 
packages, which may contain unintended or unsubstantiated information. 
Accordingly, metaphoric communication may make something appear self-
evident, which is far from what is intended or justified in the circumstances. 
Thus, someone may be a “tiger” at work, but a “pussycat” at home. The 
tiger metaphor alone, however, carries with it the information that a tiger is 
a tiger all of the time. 
We use metaphors in law extensively. One of the first metaphors 
students learn in law school is that law is a seamless web.65 Legal principles 
are strands in a web that are tied to every other legal principle, if only 
remotely. This is a useful metaphor because it helps in understanding, for 
example, that a vested rights rule may blend into an estoppel rule, and the 
two may blend into a nonconforming use rule,66 and all three may blend 
into a takings rule.67 But how far does the metaphor extend? That is, to 
 
 63. For a discussion of the way in which rules of law capture the imagination, see Margaret 
Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 819 (1989) (“[O]ur understanding of 
rule-following must be reconstituted so that we know that rules are neither formal in the 
traditional sense, nor eternal, nor existing independently of us; and so that we know that every 
application of them is a reinterpretation.”). See also JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF 
CULTURE 25 (1988) (Ethnographers have also become captives of their cognitive lenses, as “[t]he 
process is complicated by the action of multiple subjectivities and political constraints beyond the 
control of the writer.”). 
 64. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 7–9 (1990). 
 65. See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 1175, 1220 (2006) (describing the “law is a seamless web” metaphor as “well-worn cliché”). 
 66. See 3 MARTINEZ, supra note 43, § 16:64 (describing the interconnected concept of a 
vested right with the estoppel rule). 
 67. These can all be mapped onto a continuum in which a nonconforming use is a 
completed project, such as an existing duplex in a zone that has been changed to single family 
residential. As a general rule, such a structure may remain until the person has amortized his/her 
investment and/or the useful life of the building. But suppose someone merely obtained a 
building permit, incurred substantial liabilities, and performed substantial construction in good-
MARTINEZ_FINAL EDITS_GUNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/25/2015 1:10 PM 
Issue 3] A COGNITIVE SCIENCE APPROACH TO TAKINGS 481 
 
what extent can we trust the cognitive model qua metaphor to present 
information from the domain of biology that is useful in the domain of law? 
In terms of the metaphor, one is tempted to ask: Who or what is the spider? 
Are legislatures or judges or lawyers who make law “spider-like?” Do they 
capture the careless and suck out their vital juices? Are these bits of 
information carried by the web metaphor necessarily true of law? Or are 
they just possible dangers? Are people caught in the web and eaten by the 
spider? 
A cognitive approach to law facilitates understanding of the processes 
of legal change, but it does not do so predictably. As legal doctrines change 
over time, we may trace their development in cognitive terms; legal theories 
as cognitive constructs can evolve over time, interact with neighboring 
theories and be completely replaced by new theories reflective of more 
contemporary experiences, metaphors, cultural knowledge, and economic 
experience.68 This results in indeterminacy regarding which theory applies 
in any given case, which metaphoric elaborations inform that theory, and 
whether, when, and how a theory may evolve into or be supplanted by 
another theory. This indeterminacy, however, does not diminish the 
explanatory power of the cognitive science approach to law, but merely 
confirms the contingent character of our thought processes.69 Cognitive 
science rejects the objectivist claim that there is a mind-body dichotomy 
 
faith reliance on the permit before the zoning was changed? Then the person would have the 
right to continue the construction to its completion, at which point the structure would be a 
nonconforming use subject to being removed in a reasonable period of time as any other 
nonconforming use. But suppose that there was no “permit” as such, but that there were 
substantial and specific representations by the local city council that the construction would be 
allowed to continue even after the zoning was changed. Then, unless some overriding public 
policy would be offended, the person would be able to continue the project to completion under 
an “estoppel” doctrine in spite of the changed zoning. But what if there had been no permit or 
representation and the landowner had instead merely bought the property with the expectation of 
developing it as duplexes by the time the zoning was changed? Then the just compensation clause 
would ask whether the government would be required to allow the construction to continue, on 
the ground that the proposed rezoning “goes too far” and constitutes a “taking” of property. 
 68. For an examination of First Amendment doctrine in cognitive terms, see Winter, 
Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 1416, at 1186–95 (tracing evolution from a rudimentary first 
amendment “idealized cognitive model,” or “ICM,” consisting of the image of an individual on a 
soapbox and the image of a basement press cranking out leaflets, to a more sophisticated 
marketplace of ideas ICM, which entails the metaphors of minds as machines, and ideas as products 
and commodities). Later in the same article, Winter examines commerce clause doctrine and 
demonstrates how a container ICM, whose metaphor is a stream of commerce, is replaced by a 
source-path-goal ICM, whose metaphor is a journey. See id. at 1199–1206. 
 69. See id. at 1195–98 (exploring this indeterminacy); see also Elinor Ostrom, Institutional 
Arrangements and the Commons Dilemma, in RETHINKING INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 101, 120 (Vincent Ostrom, David Feeney & Hartmut Picht eds., 1989) 
(suggesting that multiple levels of analysis are needed to understand institutional behavior). 
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whereby cognitive models correspond to some part of the body’s experience 
in the world and that, therefore, there must be a “true” cognitive model 
that accurately represents reality and against which all other models can be 
measured; instead, cognitive science proposes that cognitive models are 
simply phenomena that describe how humans behave.70 A liberating insight 
of cognitive science is that there is no “perfect” cognitive model, only 
different models.71 Cognitive science thus accommodates different solutions 
to problems. Different people may entertain different solutions to the same 
problem, depending on their unique experiences.72 In fact, the same 
individual may entertain different solutions to the same problem, depending 
on which cognitive model or models the person applies.73 This does not 
necessarily lead to the “slide to solipsism,”74 whereby there are no right 
answers—because there are no wrong answers—as there is no objective 
reality against which to measure any answer. Such criticism presupposes 
that it is answers we seek, rather than illumination of the processes that we 
use to arrive at answers.75 
We can apply a cognitive approach to law by (1) describing the core 
and periphery of legal doctrine in any given field in conventional terms; (2) 
identifying the basic experiences, cognitive models, and related metaphors 
which legal doctrine may embody; (3) critically analyzing these basic 
experiences, idealized cognitive models, and metaphors to review their 
 
 70. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 1416, at 1117–19. 
 71. “[S]elective [obtaining and recalling of information through schemas] can no more be 
disputed than selective attention due to motivation, interests, or task demands.” MANDLER, supra 
note 18, at 110. 
 72. See Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 16, at 1127 (“One is forced to confront the 
possibility that each individual may have her own internally coherent system of meaning.”). 
Motorcycles and their parts illustrate this concept well: 
For example, the feedback mechanism[,] which includes the camshaft[,] cam chain[,] 
tappets[,] and distributor[,] exists only because of an unusual cut of this analytic knife. If 
you were to go to a motorcycle-parts department and ask them for a feedback assembly 
they wouldn’t know what the hell you were talking about. They don’t split it up that 
way. No two manufacturers ever split it up quite the same way and every mechanic is 
familiar with the problem of the part you can’t buy because you can’t find it because the 
manufacturer considers it a part of something else. 
ROBERT M. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 79 (1974). 
 73. See Schlag, supra note 14, at 1207–09, 1243–50 (explaining that individual judges may 
entertain prerationalist, rationalist, modernist and postmodernist modes of cognition 
simultaneously). “Since many schemas can be active simultaneously, it cannot be that only the 
information relevant to one schema is selected [for obtaining and recalling information].” 
MANDLER, supra note 18, at 109. 
 74. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 16, at 1127. 
 75. “[Experientialist epistemology] rejects, an objectivist, correspondence view of meaning 
and rationality.” Id. at 1131. 
MARTINEZ_FINAL EDITS_GUNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/25/2015 1:10 PM 
Issue 3] A COGNITIVE SCIENCE APPROACH TO TAKINGS 483 
 
application in contemporary doctrine; and (4) making observations about 
the possible evolution of doctrine in cognitive terms. 
II. A Cognitive Science Approach to Takings 
A. Core Areas of Takings Doctrine in Conventional Terms 
Takings doctrine is notoriously untidy.76 However, some core areas 
garner general consensus. One core area is that there are several 
constitutional clauses that are relevant to takings analysis: the Equal 
Protection Clause,77 the Contract Clause,78 the Due Process Clause,79 and 
the Just Compensation Clause.80 
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits dissimilar treatment of 
similarly situated people.81 Together with 42 U.S.C. § 1983,82 the Equal 
 
 76. The Author’s work in the takings field includes JOHN MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT 
TAKINGS (2006) (one-volume treatise); A Prudential Theory for Providing a Forum for Federal Takings 
Claims, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445 (2001); No More Free Easements: Judicial Takings for Private 
Necessity, 40 REAL EST. L.J. 425 (2012); Getting Back the Public’s Money: The Anti-Favoritism Norm in 
American Property Law, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 619 (2010); A Proposal for Establishing Specialized Federal and 
State “Takings Courts,” 61 ME. L. REV. 467 (2009); Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting 
“Liberty-Property,” 59 HASTINGS L.J. 515 (2008); Taming the Takings Tiger, 12-JAN. UTAH B.J. 7 
(1999); A Framework for Addressing Takings Problems, 9-JUL. UTAH B.J. 13 (1996); Statutes Enacting 
Takings Law: Flying in the Face of Uncertainty, 26 URB. LAW. 327 (1994); Trees in the Forest: A Reply to 
Professor Laitos, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 51 (1993); A Critical Analysis of the 
1987 Takings Trilogy: The Keystone, Nollan and First English Cases, 1 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 39 
(1988); Reconstructing the Takings Doctrine by Redefining Property and Sovereignty, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
157 (1988); Taking Time Seriously: The Federal Constitutional Right to Be Free From “Startling” State Court 
Overrulings, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 297 (1988). See also 3 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW §§ 16:53–16:62 (last updated Sept. 2014) (suggesting a framework for 
considering standards of judicial review of local government land use decisions). 
 77. “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 78. The Contract Clause prohibits a state from passing a “[l]aw impairing the [o]bligation 
of [c]ontracts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, para. 1. 
 79. “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 80. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. 
 81. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 414 (1920) 
(stating that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that all similarly 
situated people be treated alike). See also Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist. of Harris Cnty., 836 F.2d 
921, 932 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Because the [equal protection] clause’s protection reaches only 
dissimilar treatment among similar people, if the challenged government action does not appear 
to classify or distinguish between two or more relevant persons or groups, then the action does not 
deny equal protection of the laws.”). 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: 
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Protection Clause provides a monetary remedy for circumstances in which 
governmental action detrimentally affects one person’s private property, 
while not similarly affecting the property of others who are similarly 
situated. Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, however, has developed a 
tiered structure of judicial review, under which economic interests affected 
by governmental action are given only minimal protection.83 When purely 
economic interests are affected, it is fairly settled that a court will afford a 
remedy only if the means used is not rationally related to the achievement 
of a legitimate governmental objective.84 That standard of review is highly 
likely to result in sustaining governmental action. For that reason, the Equal 
Protection Clause, when used as a device for protection of private economic 
interests from governmental action, has more or less withered on the vine.85 
The Contract Clause, by its terms, only protects against unreasonable 
interference with contracts by state legislative action.86 The limited scope of 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). 
 83. Classifications affecting suspect traits or fundamental rights are subjected to strict 
judicial scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, the burden is on the government to demonstrate that the 
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. If quasi-suspect classifications, 
such as gender, illegitimacy or disability are involved, a middle-tier form of judicial review, 
whereby the government must show a substantial rather than a necessary relationship to an 
important rather than a compelling governmental interest is triggered. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. 
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 459 (1981) (discussing the use of the middle-tier form of judicial review, 
intermediate scrutiny, in a case involving gender). 
 84. See Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 237–38 (3rd Cir. 1987) (demonstrating 
how deferential such a standard can be). 
 85. In Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000), the Court in a per curiam opinion 
held: 
[The plaintiff properly stated an equal protection violation by] alleging that the Village 
had intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement as a condition of connecting her 
property to the municipal water supply where the Village required only a 15-foot 
easement from other similarly situated property owners. The complaint also alleged that 
the Village’s demand was “irrational and wholly arbitrary” and that the Village 
ultimately connected her property after receiving a clearly adequate 15-foot easement. 
[The Court concluded that] [t]hese allegations, quite apart from the Village’s subjective 
motivation, [were] sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection 
analysis. 
Olech, however, is relatively recent, and there is no indication that the comparatively activist 
standard of judicial review developed under the Just Compensation Clause will apply in such an 
Equal Protection setting alleging deprivation of property rights. 
 86. Michael L. Zigler, Takings Law and the Contract Clause: A Takings Law Approach to Legislative 
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the Contract Clause makes it less desirable as a tool for challenging 
governmental action. More significantly, judicial review under the Contract 
Clause has traditionally been deferential.87 Thus, as with minimal review 
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Contract Clause has also been 
relegated to a secondary status as a tool for challenging governmental 
action affecting private rights.88 
The Due Process Clause prohibits governmental deprivation of life, 
liberty or property without due process.89 Procedural due process, 
consisting of notice and an opportunity to be heard,90 is not usually the 
problem in takings cases; claimants do not usually maintain that they have 
not been given the necessary procedural protections, but instead insist that 
the substantive standards applied are improper.91 That, of course, brings up 
the thorny Lochner92 problem, whereby courts—especially federal courts—
are hesitant to second-guess governmental determinations on a substantive 
ground premised on the Due Process Clause alone.93 Thus, the standard of 
 
Modifications of Public Contracts, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1449–54 (1984). A classic study of the 
Contract Clause is Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pts. 1–3), 57 HARV. L. 
REV. 512, 621, 852 (1944). 
 87. E.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983); 
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). 
 88. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 502–06 (1987) 
(discussing the severely reduced role of the Contracts Clause in property rights protection). See also 
JOHN MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS § 2:31 (2014) (discussing reduced utility of Contracts 
Clause for protection of property rights). 
 89. “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of . . . property, without due process of 
law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 90. See, e.g., Crosby v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 975 So. 2d 1222, 1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2008) (“Error! Main Document Only.Procedural due process serves as a vehicle to ensure fair 
treatment through the proper administration of justice where substantive rights are at issue, and 
requires fair notice and a real opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (“[Zoning 
regulations violate substantive due process if they] are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having 
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”); Corn v. City of 
Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1375–76 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[Substantive due process] prevents 
a government from restricting land use for no reason, or for an illegitimate reason such as 
corruption, racial or ethnic prejudice, or any other illegitimate motivation.”). 
 92. Error! Main Document Only.Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 93. Substantive due process is not entirely absent today, even in federal courts. In fact, 
because of the prerequisites to takings claims, explained in this section, substantive due process is 
experiencing a resurgence of sorts as an alternative to a takings theory under the Just 
Compensation Clause. See, e.g., Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 311 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(explaining that denial of permit application for use of property for palmistry business solely to 
placate those members of the public who express “religious” objections to palmistry is not 
legitimate governmental objective); Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1577, 
1581 n.13 (11th Cir. 1989) (asking whether actions are arbitrary and capricious, whether there 
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judicial review under the Due Process Clause is also highly deferential, 
requiring only an arguably legitimate governmental objective and a rational 
relationship between the ends and the means. 
This leaves the Just Compensation Clause. Just Compensation Clause 
takings claims initially seem straightforward: the Fifth Amendment’s Just 
Compensation Clause,94 as well as analogous state constitutional 
provisions,95 provide that the government shall not take private property96 
for public use without payment of just compensation. Two major settings 
arise: the generally uncontroversial direct condemnation setting and the non-
direct condemnation setting. With the direct condemnation setting, the 
government acts purposefully to acquire private property for some public 
project, so there is usually no question that property is affected, the 
government has taken it for public use, and the government will provide 
 
has been an abuse of power, and whether the actions have no rational relationship to a legitimate 
governmental objective); Nelson v. City of Selma, 881 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(“[L]egitimate government purposes of maintaining the character and integrity of the single 
family neighborhood, preventing undue concentration of population, lessening traffic congestion 
and maintaining property values.”); Lake Lucerne Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. Dolphin Stadium Corp., 
878 F.2d 1360, 1370 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The test for determining whether a law comports with 
substantive due process is whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” 
(quoting Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 689 (3d Cir. 1980)); Jackson Court Condo., Inc. 
v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1077 (5th Cir. 1989) (framing the test as whether action is 
“at least debatable”); Harding v. Cnty. of Door, 870 F.2d 430, 431 (7th Cir. 1989) (asking 
whether the decision allegedly denying substantive due process is “invidious or irrational”). As in 
takings analysis, there is a requirement that the governmental action be ripe for review, so the 
decisions must be “final” with respect to the property at issue. See, e.g., Greenbriar, 881 F.2d at 1571. 
However, in contrast to takings analysis, there is no requirement that compensation be sought 
prior to bringing suit under substantive due process. Id. at 1574 n.8. Local government actions 
found valid under substantive due process may nevertheless require that the government pay 
compensation for a “taking” of property. Lake Lucerne Civic Ass’n, 878 F.2d at 1370. 
 94. The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part: “[N]or shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. This prohibition extends to 
state governments through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides in pertinent part: “[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of . . . property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 
1. The Supreme Court first held that the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause is 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago. See 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
 95. State just compensation provisions are similar to the federal Just Compensation Clause, 
except that many add that “damaging” of private property will also give rise to just 
compensation. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (“Private property may be taken or damaged for 
a public use and only when just compensation . . . has first been paid to, or into court for, the 
owner.”); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 22 (“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation.”). 
 96. The prohibition also applies to taking by the federal government of property held by 
state and local governmental entities. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984). 
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the remedy of just compensation to the owner.97 For example, if I own a 
vacant lot that happens to be located in the path of a proposed freeway, 
there is no question that the government can use its inherent power of 
eminent domain to bring a direct condemnation proceeding at which 
experts will battle to determine the amount of compensation I will receive.98 
Problems arise, however, in the non-direct condemnation setting, where 
governmental conduct varies from the classic direct condemnation script.99 
Suppose that, when I purchased the vacant lot, it was zoned for apartment 
buildings. If the city thereafter rezones the area to allow only single-family 
residences in order to reduce traffic congestion, noise, and the overall 
crowded conditions that apartment buildings bring, then it is far from clear 
whether my lost expectation of someday constructing an apartment building 
is “property,” whether the governmental down-zoning constitutes a taking, 
and whether any remedy should be provided. 
In the non-direct condemnation setting, the United States Supreme 
Court has announced four takings tests.100 The first test is the Permanent 
Physical Occupation (PPO) setting, in which the government, or a third 
party authorized by the government, physically occupies private property 
permanently.101 In the second, Complete Deprivation of Economically 
Valuable Use (C-DEVU) test, the government regulation does not 
necessarily result in a physical occupation, but nevertheless deprives the 
owner of all value or economically beneficial use.102 In the third, Partial 
 
 97. Error! Main Document Only.See generally MARTINEZ, supra note 88, § 2:7 (discussing 
elements of direct condemnation). 
 98. The power of eminent domain, sometimes known as the power of “direct 
condemnation,” is referred to as “an attribute of sovereignty.” Mississippi & Rum River Boom 
Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878) (“The right of eminent domain, that is, the right to take 
private property for public uses, appertains to every independent government. It requires no 
constitutional recognition [sic]; it is an attribute of sovereignty. The [constitutional] clause[s] . . . 
providing for just compensation for property taken [are] . . . mere limitation[s] upon the exercise 
of the right.”). See also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1984); Berman v. 
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (“Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to 
realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is 
merely the means to the end.”); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 837 (Cal. 
1982) (explaining that eminent domain power is an “attribute of sovereignty,” which authorizes 
the taking of intangible personal property such as a professional football franchise). 
 99. See generally MARTINEZ, supra note 88, § 2:9 (discussing four types of non-direct 
condemnation settings). 
 100. Id. §§ 2:9–2:20 (elaborating on the four takings tests). 
 101. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434–35 (1982) 
(demonstrating the PPO where a private cable television company was authorized by New York 
law to install relay boxes and cables on private apartment buildings). 
 102. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1009 n.2, 1016–23 (1992) 
(illustrating the C-DEVU test, whereby an owner was prohibited from constructing anything 
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Deprivation of Economically Valuable Use (P-DEVU) test, the government 
regulation deprives the owner of part of the owner’s property value or 
economically beneficial use.103 
The fourth, Land Use Exactions test for takings, involves 
“circumstances in which government regulatory conduct requires an owner 
to convey a property interest to the government.”104 That test arose from 
two cases. In Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n,105 the Coastal Commission 
conditioned the issuance of a permit to build a residence on a beachfront 
lot on the landowner’s dedication of an easement allowing the public to 
traverse a strip of the lot between the owner’s seawall and the mean 
high-tide line.106 In Dolan v. City of Tigard,107 the City conditioned the 
issuance of a permit to expand a store and parking lot on the landowner’s 
dedication of an easement for water runoff and an easement for a 
bike/pedestrian path over the landowner’s land.108 The Nollan/Dolan cases 
require that when the government conditions a land development permit 
upon the conveyance of an easement to the public, the government must 
provide an individualized determination showing that the extent of harm 
prevented by the conditions imposed on the landowner are roughly 
proportional to the extent of the harm which the landowner’s development 
project will impose on the public.109 
 
other than wooden walkways no wider than six feet or small wooden decks no larger than one 
hundred forty-four square feet on two beachfront residential lots). 
 103. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614–618 (2001) (deciding that the owner of 
waterfront land who was allowed to construct residences on two lots that are part of a larger 
parcel of land has not suffered a “total taking,” but nevertheless should be allowed to demonstrate 
whether he has suffered a “partial taking” of the larger parcel). 
 104. MARTINEZ, supra note 88, §§ 2:18–2:19. Exaction situations arise both (a) when the 
government denies a land use permit as well as when it conditions the grant of a land use permit on 
the dedication of realty to the government, and (b) when the government demands money, as well 
as when it demands conveyance of realty as a condition on the grant of a land use permit. Koontz v. 
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2589–93 (2013). 
 105. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 106. Id. at 828. 
 107. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 108. Id. at 380–81. 
 109. Id. at 391 (“We think a term such as ‘rough proportionality’ best encapsulates what we 
hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is 
required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required 
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”). The 
Nollan/Dolan cases also require, as a threshold matter, that the government demonstrate there is 
an “essential nexus” between a “legitimate state interest” and the permit conditions demanded 
from the landowner. Id. at 386. That requirement is easily met, however, because any police 
power objective falling within protection of the health, safety, welfare, and morals will suffice and 
the means used (the condition imposed) need only be reasonably likely to achieve it. Thus, both of 
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In identifying the circumstances in which the rough proportionality 
standard is triggered, the U.S. Supreme Court in Dolan explained (1) if no 
permit had been required or sought by Mrs. Dolan, and the City had 
simply demanded the easements, that would be the classic direct 
condemnation setting, and the City could not have done so without 
payment;110 (2) the City clearly could have subjected Mrs. Dolan to general 
zoning restrictions, even if that substantially diminished the value of her 
land;111 and (3) the Court distinguished Mrs. Dolan’s situation from general 
zoning restrictions, characterizing it as more akin to the direct 
condemnation scenario:112 
First, [general zoning restrictions] involved essentially legislative 
determinations classifying entire areas of the city, whereas here the city 
made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s application for a 
building permit on an individual parcel. Second, the conditions imposed 
were not simply a limitation on the use petitioner might make of her 
own parcel, but a requirement that she deed portions of the property to 
the city. . . . Under the well-settled doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions,” 
the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional 
right—here the right to receive just compensation when property is 
taken for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit 
conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no 
relationship to the property.113 
 
the conditions in Dolan easily met that test: the floodplain easement condition was reasonably 
likely to combat additional flooding caused by Mrs. Dolan’s expanded hardware store and the 
bikepath easement condition was reasonably likely to address the additional traffic that would be 
generated by the expansion. Id. at 387 (“Undoubtedly, the prevention of flooding along Fanno 
Creek and the reduction of traffic congestion in the Central Business District qualify as the type of 
legitimate public purposes we have upheld. . . . It seems equally obvious that a nexus exists 
between preventing flooding along Fanno Creek and limiting development within the creek’s 
100-year floodplain.”). Thus, since it is largely duplicative of deferential Due Process Clause 
judicial review, the “essential nexus” requirement is neither significant nor problematic for Just 
Compensation Clause takings analysis. Instead, it is the “rough proportionality” standard that has 
the real bite. 
 110. Id. at 384 (“Without question, had the city simply required petitioner to dedicate a strip 
of land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather than conditioning the grant of her permit to 
redevelop her property on such a dedication, a taking would have occurred.”). 
 111. Id. at 384–85 (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.” 
(quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922))). 
 112. See id. at 396 Error! Main Document Only.(“Cities have long engaged in the 
commendable task of land use planning, made necessary by increasing urbanization, particularly 
in metropolitan areas such as Portland. The city’s goals of reducing flooding hazards and traffic 
congestion, and providing for public greenways, are laudable, but there are outer limits to how 
this may be done. ‘A strong public desire to improve the public condition [will not] warrant 
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.’” 
(quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416)). 
 113. Id. at 385 (emphasis added). The Court held that since the City had not made the 
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The Nollan/Dolan rough proportionality standard cannot be fully 
understood without factoring in the connection between that test and the 
“not substantially advance-legitimate governmental objective”114 (NSA-
LGO) test for takings. The NSA-LGO test asks whether the means used by 
the government substantially advances the ends it seeks to achieve.115 In 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,116 the U.S. Supreme Court overruled its twenty-
five year history of using the NSA-LGO test on the ground that it was more 
of a Due Process Clause test, focused on the legitimacy of governmental 
action rather than a Just Compensation Clause test, focused on the burden 
that the government imposes on property owners.117 The Court held that 
the NSA-LGO test violated separation of powers concerns by authorizing 
courts to second-guess legislative determinations.118 Significantly, however, 
the Court held in Lingle that the Nollan/Dolan rough proportionality 
standard was still good law, reasoning that while the Nollan/Dolan cases 
“drew upon the language” of the NSA-LGO standard, they “did not apply 
[it].”119 
 
required “rough proportionality” showing, it could not impose the easement conditions on Mrs. 
Dolan’s permit. If the City wanted the easements, it would have to pay for them. Id. at 396 (“The 
city’s goals of reducing flooding hazards and traffic congestion, and providing for public 
greenways, are laudable, but there are outer limits to how this may be done. ‘A strong public 
desire to improve the public condition [will not] warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut 
than the constitutional way of paying for the change.’” (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 
416)). 
 114. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (“The application of a general 
zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance 
legitimate state interests . . . .”), abrogated in part, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 
(2005). 
 115. Error! Main Document Only.See id. at 260–61. 
 116. Lingle, 544 U.S. 528. 
 117. Id. at 540 (“There is no question that the ‘substantially advances’ formula was derived 
from due process, not takings, precedents.”). 
 118. Id. at 544 (“[T]he ‘substantially advances’ formula is not only doctrinally untenable as a 
takings test—its application as such would also present serious practical difficulties. The Agins 
formula can be read to demand heightened means-ends review of virtually any regulation of 
private property. If so interpreted, it would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array 
of state and federal regulations—a task for which courts are not well suited. Moreover, it would 
empower—and might often require—courts to substitute their predictive judgments for those of 
elected legislatures and expert agencies.”). 
 119. Id. at 546. The Court further distinguished the Nollan/Dolan decisions by noting that 
both cases involved “adjudicative land-use exactions—specifically, government demands that a 
landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to her property as a condition of 
obtaining a development permit.” Id. The Court held that in those cases, it was the burden on the 
landowner that was relevant and decisive: “[B]oth involved dedications of property so onerous 
that, outside the [permit condition] context, they would [have been] deemed per se physical 
takings.” Id. at 547. Thus, the Court concluded, the Nollan/Dolan cases actually involved 
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The Nollan/Dolan rough proportionality standard also cannot be fully 
understood without an appreciation of its connection to the distinction 
between governmental prevention of imposition of harms on the public by 
private development projects, on the one hand, and governmental 
extraction of benefits to be conferred on the public from private 
development projects, on the other. 120 This “harm prevention-benefits 
extraction” distinction also was soundly rejected as a takings test by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,121 where the 
Court emphasized that 
the distinction between “harm-preventing” and “benefit-conferring” 
regulation is often in the eye of the beholder. It is quite possible, for 
example, to describe in either fashion the ecological, economic, and 
esthetic concerns that inspired the South Carolina Legislature in the 
present case. One could say that imposing a servitude on Lucas’s land is 
necessary in order to prevent his use of it from “harming” South 
Carolina’s ecological resources; or, instead, in order to achieve the 
“benefits” of an ecological preserve.122 
B. Basic Experiences, Idealized Cognitive Models, and 
Related Metaphors Which Takings Doctrine May 
Embody 
The structure of the conventional takings tests reflects a profound 
division between people’s property, on the one hand, and governmental 
action that affects that property, on the other. This conceptualization of the 
takings problem casts the government in the role of actor in relation to 
people’s property as the object. It reveals an alienation from government 
that may be an elaboration of a basic experience that government is “out 
 
a special application of the “doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,” which provides 
that “the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here 
the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in 
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit has 
little or no relationship to the property.” 
Id. at 547 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)). 
 120. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024–25 (1992) (“[T]he 
distinction between ‘harm-preventing’ and ‘benefit-conferring’ regulation is often in the eye of the 
beholder.”); compare Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (determining that the destruction 
of cedar trees to prevent contamination of apple orchards with cedar rust is prevention of public 
harm), and Just v. Marinette Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 770–71 (Wis. 1972) (preventing landowner 
from filling shoreline wetlands constitutes preventing a public harm), with Bartlett v. Zoning 
Comm’n of Old Lyme, 282 A.2d 907, 910 (1971) (explaining that an owner barred from filling 
tidal marshland has been subjected to an unconstitutional taking and must be compensated). 
 121. 505 U.S. 1003. 
 122. Id. at 1024. 
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there,” acting on individual interests, and is often not benign. 
The idealized cognitive model that these basic experiences inform is 
the public-private distinction.123 Under the public-private distinction 
model, there is a domain of private existence distinct from government 
within which we are substantially free from constraints that are socially 
defined.124 Within that private sphere, at least in an idealized sense, every 
person is a law unto himself or herself.125 
The metaphors that derive from the public-private dichotomy 
reinforce its binary character: we attack governmental action “on its face,” 
attempting to invalidate it in all circumstances, or we attack governmental 
action “as applied,” whereby we try to check governmental power in 
specific circumstances.126 
 
 123. See Chris Sagers, Monism, Nominalism, and Public-Private in the Work of Margaret Jane Radin, 
54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 219, 219–23 (2006) (discussing the origins and evolution of the public-
private distinction). 
 124. The debate about the public-private distinction has turned largely on whether private 
activity should be subject to the same constraints as governmental action, and has revolved 
around the state action doctrine, an analytical tool for determining whether otherwise private 
conduct is subject to constitutional constraint. See Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices and 
Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1483–92, 1484 
n.156 (1982) (arguing for elimination of the state action requirement altogether). See generally 
Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 
(1982) (demonstrating amusingly that the public-private distinction is unworkable). This debate 
notwithstanding, the accepted wisdom is that purely private action is not subject to constitutional 
constraint: “Where an ordinary mortal is concerned, we can discern a value in preserving a 
sphere, free from state influence, in which he or she may be arbitrary, capricious, and 
prejudicial.” Stone, supra, at 1489. Professor Brest, however, has demonstrated the fundamental 
connection between the state action doctrine and the natural rights theory of property; the state 
action doctrine prevents examination of assertions of private power in the name of rights to 
property existing independently of government. Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote 
on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1299–1300 (1982). See also Frug, supra note 
24, at 1128–49 (1980) (discussing both traditional and modernist critiques of the “private”-ness of 
the power of private corporations). 
 125. But see Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876 (1990) (using peyote for religious reasons, 
which properly prohibited by state law of general application, was upheld as basis for denial of 
unemployment benefits). 
 126. The Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493–94 (1987), 
expressly distinguished Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) on that basis: 
The second factor that distinguishes this case from Pennsylvania Coal is the finding in that 
case that the Kohler Act made mining of “certain coal” commercially impracticable. In 
this case, by contrast, petitioners have not shown any deprivation significant enough to 
satisfy the heavy burden placed upon one alleging a regulatory taking. . . . The posture 
of the case is critical because we have recognized an important distinction between a 
claim that the mere enactment of a statute constitutes a taking and a claim that the 
particular impact of government action on a specific piece of property requires the 
payment of just compensation. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 493–94. 
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C. Critical Analysis of the Basic Experiences, Idealized 
Cognitive Models, and Metaphors in Contemporary 
Takings Doctrine 
The basic experience that government is “out there” acting on private 
interests is a constraining foundation upon which to build a workable 
takings doctrine. It casts individuals as alienated from government. This is 
not necessarily bad, if it keeps government from oppressing its citizens. 
Unfortunately, and more perniciously, such a basic experience 
simultaneously places a value on people according to their net economic 
worth. Thus, Donald Trump is probably glad that there is a sphere of 
private sovereignty in which government cannot intrude. He can gold-plate 
the bathtub spigots on his yacht without governmental constraint. The 
average welfare recipient may not be so content to know that her lack of 
income or assets means government can dictate what she must eat, where 
she must sleep, whether she must work, what she can buy, and where she 
can buy it.127 For the welfare recipient, there is no protective “property” 
sphere. There is only grudgingly conferred minimal survival, and often not 
even that.128 
The two questions posed by the takings problem are really one: 
“[U]nder what circumstances is government justified in expanding, 
contracting or even completely eliminating private expectations?”129 This 
conceptualization of the takings problem is premised on a basic experience 
 
The distinction has also been elaborated as highly significant in the due process field. For 
example, in Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Court was asked whether the Due Process Clause 
prohibited the enactment of a zoning ordinance, which had the effect of depriving a property 
owner from making the most profitable use of its property. In sustaining the ordinance, the Court 
emphasized that invalidation of statutes on their face was less likely than in “as applied” situations 
under the Due Process Clause. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
As if by contrast, in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, the Court confronted an “as applied” situation in 
which a zoning ordinance restricted a property owner to using a 100-foot portion of its property 
for residential uses even though no public harm or benefit would have resulted from allowing the 
property owner to use the portion for industrial purposes. The remainder of the property was 
zoned for industrial uses, and that side of the property was almost entirely surrounded by 
industrial uses. In that circumstance, the Court invalidated the application of the ordinance as a 
violation of Due Process. See 277 U.S. 183, 185–89 (1928). 
 127. See William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1, 34 
(1985) (noting that the conceptualization of welfare as a new form of property did not place any 
limits on the power or discretion of the state, but simply moved the power to determine welfare 
benefits from “lower tier officials toward upper tier officials and judges”). 
 128. Error! Main Document Only.See generally 3 MARTINEZ, supra note 43, § 19:51 
(describing income, financial responsibility, and household unit character as factors that restrict 
welfare benefit eligibility). 
 129. Martinez, supra note 13, at 186. 
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that does not differentiate in hard, dichotomous terms between private 
property and government. That alternative basic experience is that a legal 
claim to property is an appeal to the coercive power of the State.130 Thus, I 
cannot use, transfer, or exclude others from something I call mine unless 
the State will support my claim against others through the force of its 
administrative officers, courts, and police. Accordingly, that which I would 
call mine is but an assertion that if my claim is challenged, the State will 
stand behind me. The State and I are one, or so I would hope, whenever I 
make claims that I would like to have others take seriously. We may refer to 
this as an “integrated citizen” basic experience to differentiate it from the 
“alienated citizen” basic experience that is perhaps reflected in prevalent 
takings doctrine. 
An idealized cognitive model elaborating on that alternative basic 
experience would reject the public-private distinction and instead adopt 
any number of analytical structures. Duncan Kennedy suggests that we 
may consider a continuum, rather than the strict dichotomy inherent in the 
public-private distinction.131 According to a continuum cognitive model, we 
might view any particular case as located along a line, in relation to private 
prerogative on one extreme and governmental interests on the other. 
Where any particular case would fall along that spectrum would depend on 
the factors that we consider important. 
Alternatively, we can look at property rights in terms of the functions 
that such rights fulfill.132 These are the “general use” function, which is 
integral to self-expression, development, production, and survival; the 
“welfare” function, intended to secure an individual a meaningful life 
beyond mere survival; the “protection” function, which shields people from 
exploitation by others; the “allocative” function, which assures people a 
share of resources sufficient to allow them to participate meaningfully in the 
political process; and the “sovereignty” function, which confers upon 
owners the power to influence others through control of the terms under 
which property will be exchanged.133 
Another alternative cognitive model suggested by Kennedy focuses on 
functional considerations that also inhere in a loop model. According to 
 
 130. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 10 (1927); Frug, 
supra note 24, at 1066–67; Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of “Political” and 
“Economic” Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 149 (1935); Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making By Private 
Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 201–202 (1937); Martinez, supra note 13, at 158. 
 131. Kennedy, supra note 124, at 1352. 
 132. Martinez, supra note 13, at 191. The functional approach is derived in part from Baker, 
supra note 53, at 744. 
 133. Martinez, supra note 13, at 191–92. 
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that cognitive structure, two situations apparently most unlike each other 
may actually be closely related, and therefore should be treated similarly for 
legal purposes.134 Kennedy’s illustrative examples involve family matters. 
For example, we view questions about what values we will teach our 
children as among the most intimate matters of our lives, and into which 
government should not intrude. On the other hand, if a parent were 
periodically lashing a child with a bullwhip in order to get him or her to 
mind, government intervention would be a necessary and foregone 
conclusion. 
By using a functional approach in a loop cognitive model, we might 
not currently end up with resolutions through the conventional takings 
doctrine, as resolutions will depend on the functions we consider important 
and the hierarchical ordering among those functions. Thus, for example, 
suppose a statute prohibited Donald Trump from gold-plating his faucets. 
Suppose further that we adopt a standard of judicial review that 
incorporates Duncan Kennedy’s loop model, with substantive 
considerations derived from the functional approach posed by this Article 
(Martinez-Kennedy standard of judicial review). Such judicial review might 
conclude that he may have little general use function interest in gold 
faucets, because they may be only minimally important to his development, 
production, or survival, though they may be a means of self-expression. 
They are probably not necessary to secure a meaningful life, so the welfare 
function is probably not involved.135 They are not necessary to shield him 
from exploitation by others, so the protective function also is probably not 
involved. And they are probably not necessary to assure him meaningful 
participation in the political process, so the allocative function is not 
involved. Only the sovereignty function is arguably involved, since it 
represents control of those who sell gold-plated spigots, and since otherwise 
there would be no market for them to sell their wares. The question would 
then become whether this is a sufficient ground to allow the state to prevent 
Trump from gold-plating his spigots.136 
 
 134. The classic examples are probably love and hate, two apparently opposite emotions that 
share many characteristics. 
 135. The welfare function may also incorporate the expectation of rewards or profit as 
incentives to productive effort that is socially beneficial. Preventing Donald Trump from gilding 
his spigots may demoralize him and others from making enough money to be able to afford to pay 
to gild spigots, but the social utility of such incentives probably does not justify giving this 
consideration much weight. For a discussion of demoralization costs, see Frank I. Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967). 
 136. Whether any or all of the functions of property are threatened may be a fact 
determination for a jury or judge. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 
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In contrast, suppose a state statute reduces a welfare recipient’s aid 
dollar for dollar for whatever money she earns by working. Judicial review 
using the Martinez-Kennedy standard of judicial review might conclude 
that her general use function is arguably not involved, since her net level of 
support will remain the same. Her welfare function is probably involved 
because mere survival is not sufficient for human happiness. The 
exploitation function is involved, since she would be subject to exploitation 
by those who would threaten to inform the welfare department if she tried 
to work without telling the welfare agency. The allocative function may not 
be involved, since she would perhaps be better able to participate in the 
political process if she were not working, and the statute encourages her not 
to do so. And, finally, the sovereignty function would probably not be 
involved, since she would have no significant property with which to 
influence others in any event. The question, again, would become whether 
this constellation of functions suffices to prevent government from 
prohibiting her from working without experiencing a commensurate 
reduction in her welfare aid. 
The continuum and loop alternative cognitive models, enriched by a 
functional analysis, generate different metaphors than under contemporary 
takings doctrine. Under these conceptualizations, one can legitimately ask 
whether governmental conduct affecting individuals is jeopardizing the 
individual’s civilized existence in an enlightened society, or whether 
government improperly treads upon the important objectives, in functional 
terms, for which we have property in society. Such questions would not 
necessarily be possible under current formulations of the takings problem. 
And the alternative formulations suggested here would not be possible 
without a cognitive approach to takings doctrine. 
Conclusion: Possible Evolution of the Takings Doctrine in 
Cognitive Terms 
As reflected in the prevailing standard of judicial review for takings 
cases, contemporary takings doctrine is a captive of the public-private 
distinction. Although there have been efforts to suggest alternative views, 
such reformulations operate within the strictures of current legal doctrine. 
The advantage of cognitive modeling is that the terms of the discussion are 
transformed into an altogether different form of discourse. Whether takings 
 
526 U.S. 687, 702–14 (1999) (demonstrating that a jury trial in takings cases is narrowly defined; 
whether a legitimate governmental objective is involved is question of law, while the question of 
whether the means used substantially advances the legitimate governmental objective is question 
of fact). 
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doctrine evolves through consideration and adoption of alternative basic 
experiences, cognitive models, and elaborated metaphors depends, in large 
part, on whether the terminology and propositions of cognitive science 
become part of accepted legal thinking. The cutting edge of the changes, 
however, will be embodied in modified standards of judicial review. 
